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CIVIL COMMITMENT OF THE MENTALLY ILL:
LESSARD v. SCHMIDT
On October 29, 1971, Miss Alberta Lessard was picked up in front
of her residence in West Allis, Wisconsin, by two police officers and taken
to a mental health center in Milwaukee, where she was detained on an
emergency basis. Three days later, without a preliminary hearing on
probable cause for detention, a judge of the Milwaukee County Court
issued an order permitting the confinement of Miss Lessard for an additional ten days. On November 4, a Doctor Currier formally stated to
the county court judge that Miss Lessard was a schizophrenic and recommended that she be permanently committed. The judge ordered an examination by two physicians and entered a second ten day detention order, which was extended again on November 12. Throughout this initial
series of hearings, neither Miss Lessard nor anyone who might act on her
behalf was informed of the proceedings.
Through her own initiative, Miss Lessard retained counsel through Milwaukee Legal Services. She was given less than 24 hours notice of a
November 16 commitment hearing, which had to be reset for November
26 to allow her attorney an opportunity to appear. Her request to go
home during this ten day period was denied without reason. She was
given no notice of the names of persons who would testify against her,
of her right to a jury trial, nor the basis upon which her continued detention would be sought. At the commitment hearing, the judge ordered
Miss Lessard committed for 30 additional days giving no reason other
than his finding that she was mentally ill. He made no findings on the
issue of dangerousness, despite the fact that the evidence of her attempted
suicide 26 days earlier was of a hearsay nature and the fact that a staff
psychiatrist at the mental hospital testified that, in his opinion, she presently had no suicidal tendencies. The judge refused to consider any alternatives less restrictive than commitment and did not disclose the standard
of proof, if any, which was used to decide the issues.
Three days following her commitment, hospital authorities permitted
her to go home on an out-patient parole basis. However, successive 30
day commitment orders were issued for nearly one year, thereby maintaining the involuntarily committed status of Miss Lessard.
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Miss Lessard initiated a class action on 'behalf of herself and all persons
18 years of age and older who were being held involuntarily pursuant
to any provision of Wisconsin's involuntary commitment statute.' Jurisdiction was claimed under 42 U.S.C. § 19832 and a three judge court
was requested pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2281, and 'allowed in view of the
substantial constitutional claims raised by the pleadings. The complaint
sought declaratory and injunctive relief against enforcement of certain
provisions of Wisconsin's statutes relating to the procedure for commitment of mentally ill persons and an injunction against the further detention of Miss Lessard. In finding for the plaintiff, the Federal District
Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin found several of the procedures authorized by the Wisconsin statute to be constitutionally defective
and also strictly limited the power of the state to involuntarily commit
both dangerous and non-dangerous mentally ill persons. The court
granted the requested injunction 'as to Miss Lessard and ordered release
or rehearing of all members of the plaintiff class who were committed
pursuant to the defective procedures noted in the opinion. Lessard v.
Schmidt.8
Lessard is significant in at least two respects: (1) it strictly limits state
power to commit certain classes of mentally ill persons, and (2) it makes
applicable to the involuntary commitment process, as a matter of constitutional right, several -procedural safeguards which apply to the trial of
criminal defendants. In addition, the court makes clear at the outset of
its opinion that, in order to resolve plaintiffs' claims, an analysis of the
justifications which underlie civil commitment theory and procedure is required. The resulting broad scope of the opinion is a rarity among cases
in the mental health field.
In evaluating the effect of Lessard upon the problem of protecting the
rights of alleged mentally ill persons subject to involuntary commitment,
this note will examine the extent of state commitment powers and consider the procedural limitations which have been imposed on the commit1. WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 51.001 et seq. (Supp. 1969).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
3. 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and remanded, 42 U.S.L.W.
3402 (U.S. Jan. 15, 1974) [hereinafter cited as Lessard]. The actual entry of an

order granting injunctive relief did not occur until about nine months after the opinion, which indicated that plaintiffs were entitled to an injunction, was filed.
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ment process by statute and case law. Following this will be an analysis
of the holdings of the court in Lessard. In order to provide a proper
framework for the subsequent discussions, the following section will
briefly define the two key concepts.
I.

A.

DEFINITIONS

What is Mental Illness?

The Draft Act for the Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill, upon which
several state statutes are based, defines a mentally ill individual as "an
individual having a psychiatric or other disease which substantially impairs his mental health."' 4 The Wisconsin statute involved in Lessard defined mental illness as "mental disease to such an extent that a person so afflicted requires care and treatment for his own welfare, or the
welfare of others or of the community." 5 Clearly, neither definition provides much in the way of standards to guide the individual who is empowered to enforce commitment laws, nor a sound basis for the use of a relaxed set of due process rights.
Since hospitalization involves the loss of an individual's liberty and
many additional civil rights, 6 the alleged mentally ill person should be
entitled to a clear standard which justifies commitment. Unfortunately,
the prospects for such a standard are poor. Mental illness has been described as '"a global medical concept with as imprecise a definition as
'physical illness.' ''7 The medical profession is in no sense in agreement
about which illnesses are properly includable within this category. The
problems involved with basing a commitment scheme on a medical
term upon which the medical profession cannot agree was discussed by
Burger (the present Chief Justice) concurring in Blocker v. United
States:8

[N]o rule of law can possibly be sound or workable which is dependent
upon the terms of another discipline whose members are in profound disagreement about what those terms mean .

. .

. This is not simply a matter

of experts disagreeing on opinions or on diagnosis, which often occurs, but
disagreement at the threshold on what their own critical terms mean. 9

4.

NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MENTAL HEALTH, FEDERAL SECURITY AGENCY, A

DRAFT ACT GovERNING HOSPITALIZATION OF THE MENTALLY ILL § 1(a) (Public
Health Service Pub. No. 51, 1951).
5. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 51.001 and § 51.75 (Art. 1(f)) (Supp. 1973).
6. See note 81 infra and accompanying text.
7. S. BRAKEL AND R. ROCK, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 60 (rev.
ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as BRAKEL AND ROCK].
8. 288 F.2d 853 (D.C. Cir. 1961).

9.

Id. at 860.
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While some authors dispute the existence of mental illness or the need
for civil commitment laws, 10 it seems that the general social view recognizes that there does exist some forms of mental disease with which the
law may properly deal in the form of commitment laws. Efforts to refine
the current legal definitions of mental illness should continue. However,
the current need to protect the rights of those who should not be subject
to commitment can be satisfied by employing more strict standards in applying the additional criteria which are used to base a commitment decision" and by adopting strict procedural safeguards in the commitment
process.
What is Involuntary Commitment?

B.

The phrase "involuntary commitment," or the more modem term "involuntary hospitalization," describes the removal of a person judged to
be mentally ill from his normal surroundings to a hospital authorized to
detain him. 12 It is wise to consider that the term should be construed
to include not only those relatively few situations in which the patient
actively opposes commitment,' 3 but also those in which the patient stands
mute at a commitment proceeding and fails to raise any objection. Used
in this inclusive sense, a proper evaluation of both commitment standards
and procedures can be made in determining the propriety of state action
and the adequacy of safeguards provided.
II.

SOURCE AND EXTENT OF STATE COMMITMENT POWERS

As a general proposition, state statutes authorize the commitment of
a mentally ill individual based upon one or more of the following criteria:
(1) to protect the public against acts of violence ("dangerous to others");
(2) to protect the individual from self-inflicted injury or peril ("dangerin order to alous to self"); and/or (3) to provide therapeutic measures
4
leviate the individual's condition ("in need of treatment").'
10.

See, e.g., N. KITTRIE, THE RIGHT TO BE DIFFERENT: DEVIANCE AND EN-

THERAPY (1971); T. SzAsz, LAw, LIBERTY AND PSYCHIATRY (1963);
Szasz, The Sane Slave: Social Control and Legal Psychiatry, 10 AM. CIM. L. REV.
The question of whether or not the state should be involved at all
337 (1972).
in the enforced treatment of certain categories of individuals is beyond the scope
of this note.
11. See note 14 infra and accompanying text.
12. BRAKEL AND ROCK, supra note 7, at 35.
13. Curran, Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill, 31 N.C.L. REV. 274, 279
(1953). See also R. ROCK, M. JACOBSON, & R. JANOPAUL, HOSPrALIZATION AND
DISCHARGE OF THE MENTALLY ILL 155-57 (1968).
14. See BRAKEL AND ROCK, supra note 7, at 72-79 for a comprehensive listing
of each state's statutory criteria for involuntary commitment.
FORCED
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The power of the state to commit mentally ill persons who fall within
one or more of the above criteria is based upon the police power and
the doctrine of parens patriae. Under the police power, the state may
confine a mentally ill person who presents a danger to other members
of society. In the parens patriae capacity, the state has the right and
the duty to protect the person and property of those who, due to mental
illness or minority, are unable to care for themselves. It is by virtue of
the parens patriae power that the state is empowered to commit a
mentally ill individual who presents a danger to himself or is considered
to be in need of treatment. 15 Where employed, the doctrine of parens
patriae has been used to justify a less comprehensive set of procedural
due process rights than is required in criminal adjudications. The basic
justification for this state of affairs is the belief that a formal adjudicatory
hearing in which full due process rights are provided is not required
where the state is proceeding for -the benefit of the individual involved.
Potential benefit to the individual is also employed as a justification for
commitment without traditional due process rights when the state seeks
commitment under the police power. In addition, the view that society's
rules cannot deter -the violent mentally ill is also used to support commitments under the police power without traditional due process safeguards.
The departure from the common law requirement of dangerousness to
others came about in America in the mid-19th century. Up until that
time, 'the basic purpose of confinement of the mentally ill was detention
and not therapy. However, as the mentally ill came to be recognized
as sick rather than cursed and as the community came to accept greater
responsibility for the care of its disadvantaged members, considerations
other than community self-protection were employed to justify commitment.' 6 The courts reflected this change in view by allowing commitments based upon state parens patriae powers. In the seminal case of
In re Josiah Oakes,17 Chief Justice Shaw of the Massachusetts Supreme
Court upheld the detention of a non-violent individual who alleged wrongful detention. In so doing, Chief Justice Shaw found that dangerousness
to self, in addition to the more familiar dangerousness to others standard,
would suffice as a proper basis for detention.' 8
The justification for commitment based upon dangerousness to self is
15. Ross, Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Problems of Law and Policy, 57
MICH. L. REV. 945, 955-57 (1959).
16. See BRAKEL AND ROCK, supra note 7, at 4-7; Comment, Civil Commitment

of the Mentally Ill: Theories and Procedures, 79 HAv. L. REV. 1288 (1966).
17. 8 LAw REP. 123 (Mass. 1845), discussed in Hallett v. Oakes, 55 Mass. 296,
1 Cush. 296 (1848).
18. Id. at 125.

1974]

CASE NOTES

1281

that the state, as parens patriae, may proceed to protect the interests of
the individual involved. Under English law, parens patriae had been
used as a source of power over the person and goods of certain mentally
ill individuals for centuries. Under the English practice, commitment was
allowed for persons deemed incompetent but it worked no deprivation of
property and civil rights during lucid moments. The American practice,
on the other hand, generally resulted in total and perhaps permanent loss
of liberty. 19
The use of parens patriae as a source of substantive power over mentally ill individuals may be viewed as motivated by humanitarian concerns. Its use, however, brought within state power a new class of individuals. This new class of potential committees were subject to unjustified commitments for two important reasons. The first of these was the
failure of the courts to require strict standards of dangerousness. 20 The
second was the belief that when the state sought to deprive an individual
of his liberty to treat rather than to punish, traditional due process rights
were considered unnecessary.
III.

PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS

This section will examine the principal arguments which are used to
limit the extent to which procedural rights should be required in civil commitment proceedings and survey certain basic procedural safeguards
which 'have been imposed on the commitment process in the several states
by statute and case law.
A.

PrincipalArguments

Whether or not an alleged mentally ill person should be entitled to the
procedural safeguards to which a criminal defendant is entitled has been
the subject of extensive controversy. Courts, 21 commentators, 22 and psy19. 349 F. Supp. at 1085.
20. See, e.g., United States v. Charnizon, 232 A.2d 586 (D.C. Ct. App. 1967)
in which the probability that the accused would issue checks drawn on insufficient
funds was held to fall within the statutory test of mental illness characterized by
dangerousness to others. See also Dodd v. Hughes, 81 Nev. 43, 398 P.2d 540
(1965) in which recidivism and a failure to respond to conventional penal and rehabilitative techniques were held to satisfy a "mentally ill and dangerous" commitment standard.
21. See, e.g., In re Coates, 9 N.Y.2d 242, 173 N.E.2d 797, 213 N.Y.S.2d 74,
appeal dismissed sub nom. Coates v. Walters, 368 U.S. 34 (1961) (initial hospitalization and later indefinite extension without notice conformed to due process where
patient retained the right to seek judicial review).
22.

(1952):

See, e.g., M. GUTTMACHER & H. WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 295
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chiatrists 23 have advanced the proposition that it is not only acceptable,
but desirable that alleged mentally ill persons receive less than the traditional due process safeguards afforded criminal defendants. Two justifications which have been advanced in support of this proposition are that
the proceeding is civil rather than criminal and that the purpose of the
commitment is not punishment but rehabilitation. 24 Neither reason supports the proposition asserted.
Several recent cases lend strong support to the view that the civil-criminal distinction is an untenable premise upon which to base a relaxation
of traditional due process standards in commitment proceedings.
In re Gault25 involved the commitment of an alleged juvenile delinquent pursuant to juvenile court proceedings which have traditionally
been classified as "civil." Notwithstanding this label, the Court held that
the privilege against self-incrimination, which by the express words of the
fifth amendment is applicable only to a "criminal case," is available in
such a proceeding because "commitment is a deprivation of liberty. It
206
is incarceration against one's will whether it is called 'criminal' or 'civil'.
Heryford v. Parker27 applied an approach similar to that used in Gault
in a habeas corpus proceeding brought by the mother of a mentally retarded son who had been committed to a state institution for the feebleminded and epileptic. The mother alleged that the state had failed to
meet the requirements of due process at least in part due to a failure
to provide counsel at the commitment proceeding. Chief Judge Murrah,
speaking for the tenth circuit, agreed:
[L]ike Gault, and of utmost importance, we have a situation in which the
liberty of an individual is at stake, and we think the reasoning in Gault
emphatically applies. It matters not whether the proceedings be labeled
,civil' or 'criminal' or whether the subject matter be mental instability or
juvenile delinquency. It is the likelihood of involuntary incarceration[Wihere the person is mentally incapable of understanding the nature of
the proceedings or preparing therefor, or is so deranged that notice would
do him harm, the purpose of protecting his interest can be more effectively
accomplished in some other way than by serving him with legal papers.
23. GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY, COMMITMENT PROCEDURES
2 (Rep. No. 4, April, 1948).
24. See Ennis, Civil Liberties and Mental Illness, 7 CRIM. LAW BULL. 101, 109

(1971). Ennis also notes-and dispells-two additional justifications: the potentially traumatic effect of a formal proceeding and the stigma which may result therefrom. Id. at 109-10.
25. 387 U.S. 1 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Gault].
26. Id. at 50. The Supreme Court has also ignored the formalistic distinctions
between civil and criminal proceedings in Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966)
and Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
27. 396 F.2d 393 (10th Cir. 1968) [hereinafter cited as Heryford],
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whether for punishment as an adult for a crime, rehabilitation as a juvenile
for delinquency, or treatment and training as a feeble-minded or mental
incompetent-which commands observance of the constitutional safeguards
of due process.

28

Taken together, these decisions appear to indicate that the traditional
due process safeguards which apply in the trial of a criminal defendant
should equally apply in a civil commitment proceeding, or in any other
proceeding in which an individual is threatened with deprivation of liberty.
The notion that commitment pursuant to relaxed due process standards
is justified due to the therapeutic rather than punitive purpose of the subsequent commitment is likewise unsupportable. In discussing the issue
in the context of juvenile courts, the Supreme Court noted:
While there can be no doubt of the original laudable purpose of juvenile
courts, studies and critiques in recent years raise serious questions as to
whether actual performance measures well enough against theoretical purpose to make tolerable the immunity of the process from the reach of constitutional guaranties applicable to adults ....
There is evidence, in
fact, that there may be grounds for concern that the child receives the
worst of both worlds: that he gets neither the protections accorded to
adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative treatment postulated for
29
children.

There can be little doubt that civil commitment of an adjudged mentally
ill individual similarly fails to provide the care and treatment upon which

commitment pursuant to relaxed due process standards is designed to

rest.30
But what if the rehabilitative purpose of the commitment is raised to
the level of an enforceable right? That is, may lesser procedural safeguards be allowed in a commitment proceeding than in a criminal trial
where the potential committee has a constitutional right to treatment fol28. Id. at 396.
29. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 555-56 (1966) (emphasis added).
30. State mental institutions are typically overcrowded and understaffed, serving
a caretaking rather than a therapeutic function for most of their inmates. In 1965,
the median number of patients per physician employed by public mental hospitals
was 102. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MENTAL HEALTH, PATIENTS IN MENTAL INSTITUTIONS, 1965 (1967). Twenty to thirty patients would constitute a relatively heavy
case load if individual psychiatric therapy were actually provided. Reibman, Rights
of Mental Patients to Treatment and Remuneration for Institutional Work Pending
Mental Health Legislation, 39 PA. B. ASS'N Q. (1968). In 1961, a Senate committee
was told that half the patients in state mental hospitals receive no treatment and
that "in most public mental hospitals the average ward patient comes into personto-person contact with a physician about 15 minutes every month...." Hearings
on Constitutional Rights of the Mentally Ill Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional
Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., Ist Sess., pt. I, at 4344, 103 (1961).
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lowing civil commitment?," This question should be answered in the negative. The courts should not allow the constitutionally based right to
treatment to bolster an argument which is designed to maintain constitutionally defective procedures. The right to treatment following civil commitment has received less than universal judicial acceptance. 2 In addition, several difficulties attend enforcement of this right where it is recognized.83 But more importantly, even if there was a nationally recognized
and enforcable right to treatment, full procedural rights should be required to insure that "treatment" is not allowed for persons who do not
34
desire it, cannot benefit from it, or may be 'harmed by it.
One additional point with respect -to the "purpose" argument deserves
present note. When a mentally ill individual is committed on the basis
of a dangerous to others standard, his confinement, in a sense, is similar
to criminal confinement in that in 'both cases the state decides that society
at large will benefit from the deprivation of the individual's liberty.8 3 To
the extent that such confinement of a mentally ill individual serves a traditional criminal purpose, then, on this basis alone, it should be attended
36
by traditional criminal safeguards.
It seems clear from the above, then, that even if the purpose and effect of commitment is rehabilatative rather than punitive, that this does
not constitutionally justify the use of any fewer due process rights than
are required in a criminal trial.
31. A constitutional right to treatment was first recognized by a federal court
in Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, 784 (M.D. Ala. 1971).
32. "This Court respectfully disagrees with the conclusion reached by [the court
in Wyatt v. Stickney] in finding an affirmative federal right to treatment absent
a statute so requiring." Burnham v. Dept. of Pub. Health, 349 F. Supp. 1335, 1340
(N.D. Ga. 1972).
33. See, e.g., Wyatt v. Stickney, 334 F. Supp. 1341 (M.D. Ala. 1971); Livermore, Malmquist and Meehl, On the Justification for Civil Commitment, 117 U.
PA. L. REV. 75, 93 n.53 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Livermore]; Drake, Enforcing the Right to Treatment: Wyatt v. Stickney, 10 AMER. ClUM. L. REV. 587
(1972).
34. State enforced treatment of an individual against his will raises the specter
of enforced state behavioral norms. See, e.g., KITTRIE, supra note 10, at 45-49 and
386-94. Second, certain types of mental illnesses are presently untreatable. See,
e.g., Livermore, supra note 33, at 93. Confining an individual with such a disease
is tantamount to punishing him for being mentally ill in contravention of Robinson
v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). Finally, "any lengthy hospitalization, particularly where it is involuntary, may greatly increase the symptoms of mental illness
and make adjustment to society more difficult." 349 F. Supp. at 1087.
35. Comment, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Theories and Procedures,
79 HAmv. L. REv. 1288, 1289 (1966).
36. Ennis, supra note 24, at 109.
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Survey of RequiredProcedures
(1) Notice and Opportwenity To Be Heard

In 1971, only twenty-six of the forty-two jurisdictions which had judicial hospitalization procedures required by statute that notice be given to
the alleged mentally ill individual of the commitment proceeding. Nine
states, including Wisconsin, allowed for the omission of notice where it
would be harmful to the patient. The remaining states allowed either
notice to be served on the individual or someone on his behalf or had
no statute on the subject. In only twelve jurisdictions did the statute spec37
ify the minimum notice permissible.
Courts are apparently divided on whether notice and a hearing prior
to hospitalization are required by due process. In In re Wellman,' 8 which
is followed by some courts, it was held that notice and a hearing are required. In response to the assertion that notice of a commitment hearing
should not be required 'because it might be ineffective or futile, the Kansas Court of Appeals stated:
Notice and opportunity to be heard lie at the foundation of all judicial
procedure. They are fundamental principles of justice, which cannot be
ignored . . . . It will not do to say that it is useless to serve notice upon
an insane person,-that it would avail nothing, because of his inability to
take advantage of it. His sanity is the very thing to be tried.39

Where statutes have dispensed with all requirements of notice and the
opportunity to be present at the hearing and have no provision for substitute notice, they have been held invalid. 40 However, where the patient
has the unqualified right, either through statutory provisions for a post-hospitalization hearing or through habeas corpus, to contest the validity of
his hospitalization in a judicial hearing, hospitalization without a hearing
has been held valid. 41 It may be noted, however, that in only seventeen
states does the patient have an unrestricted right to communicate with
an attorney. 42 As a result, !the patient's ability to contest the validity of
his hospitalization is, in those states which do not provide for unrestricted
communication with counsel following commitment without a hearing, severely hampered if not totally frustrated.
37. BRAx L AND ROCK, supra note 7, at 52. See id. at 72-79 (contains a listing
of each individual state requirement).
38. 3 Kan. App. 100, 45 P. 726 (1896).
39. Id. at 103, 45 P. at 727.
40. See BRACKEL AND ROCK, supra note 7, at 52 n. 163 and citations therein.
41. Id. at 52.
42. Id. at 174-79 (contains a listing of the state provisions involved).
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Right to Counsel

Forty-two jurisdictions provide that the alleged mentally ill individual
has the right to ;be represented by counsel. However, only twenty-four
provide for the appointment of counsel in all commitment cases in which
the person has none. In seven jurisdictions, such appointments may be
made -at the discretion of the court, and in five states appointment is
48
mandatory upon the individual's request.
In Argersinger v. Hamlin,"44 the Supreme Court extended the right to
appointed counsel to all criminal proceedings in which an accused is subject to a deprivation of liberty. Chief Justice Burger, concurring in the
result, noted that "cogent factors suggest the infirmities in any approach
that allows confinement for any period without the aid of counsel at trial;
any deprivation of liberty is a serious matter. ' 45 In Gault the Court
noted ,that the individual whose freedom is in jeopardy,
needs the assistance of counsel to cope with the problems of law, to make
skilled inquiry into the facts, to insist upon regularity of the proceedings,
and to ascertain whether he has a defense and to prepare and submit it.46

In Heryford a right to counsel in proceedings to involuntarily commit
a mentally deficient individual was held to be a due process right, guaranteed under the fourteenth amendment. In its opinion, the court noted
that
[w]here . .. the state undertakes to act in parens patriae, it has the inescapable duty to . . .see that a subject of an involuntary commitment proceedings is afforded the opportunity to [have] the guiding hand of legal
counsel at every step of the proceedings, unless effectively waived by one
4
authorized to act in his behalf. 7

IV.
A.

Lessard v. Schmidt

Substantive Limitations on State Commitment Powers

Under § 51.02(5) of Wisconsin's Mental Health Act, the court may
order a patient involuntarily committed if it is "satisfied that he is mentally ill or infirm or deficient and that he is a proper subject for custody
and treatment . .

. ."

The plaintiffs in Lessard at-tacked this statute (1)

on the grounds of vagueness and overbreadth, (2) for its allowance of
commitment based upon a preponderance of the evidence, and (3) for
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. at 54. See id. at 125-28 (contains a listing of each state's statute).
407 U.S. 25 (1972).
Id. at 41.
387 U.S. 1, 36 (1967).
396 F.2d 393, 396 (10th Cir. 1968).
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its failure to allow for the concept of less drastic means. The court (1)
avoided a finding of vagueness, (2) found that commitment based upon
a preponderance of the evidence is violative of due process of law, and
(3) construed the statute so as to allow for the concept of less drastic
means.
The court avoided a "void for vagueness" analysis of the Wisconsin
commitment statute by employing the United States Supreme Court opinion, Humphrey v. Cady,4s which interpreted commitment under the
Wisconsin sex crimes statute in light of the Wisconsin statute which defines mental illness. 49 In dicta, the Court noted that implicit in the definition is the requirement that a person's "potential for doing harm, to
himself or to others, is great enough to justify such a massive curtailment
of liberty." 50 From this, the court in Lessard implied a balancing test,
stating that
[the Supreme Court's] approval of a requirement that the potential for doing harm be "great enough to justify such a massive curtailment of liberty"
implies a balancing test in which the state must bear the burden of proving
that there is an extreme likelihood that if the person is not confined he
will do immediate harm to himself or others. 5 1

After noting the caution with which a finding based upon a prediction
of future conduct must be viewed, the court refined the "extreme likelihood of immediate harm" test to require a finding of "a recent overt 'act,
attempt or threat to do substantial harm to oneself or another. '52 At
least one problem with such an approach will arise in attempting to define
"substantial" and "harm."
Importantly, the court further refined its standard with respect to commitment based upon dangerousness to self. When dangerousness to self
is alleged as the ground upon which commitment is to be based
an overt attempt to substantially harm oneself cannot be the basis for commitment unless the person is found to be 1) mentally ill and 2) in immediate danger at the time of the hearing of doing further harm to one53
self.

The court based this refinement upon two considerations. First, the justifications for commitment of an individual who, because of mental illness,
is likely to harm others do not necessarily apply to a situation of potential
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

405 U.S. 504 (1972).
See note 5 supra and accompanying text.
405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972).
349 F. Supp. at 1093 (emphasis added by court).
Id.
349 F. Supp. at 1093 n.24 (emphasis added).
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harm to self. Second, dangerousness to self need not require a finding
of mental illness such that the individual should be subject to the commitment power of the state. An attempted suicide should not, and the
4
court holds that it cannot, in itself invoke state commitment powers.1
The need to find dangerousness to self or others, by one of the above
standards, in addition to a finding of mental illness as a prerequisite to
commitment was further supported by comparing the mentally ill individual with the physically ill individual. With the exception of communicable or contagious diseases, 55 persons in need of ,physical treatment
are -allowed the choice of whether or not to undergo hospitalization and
-treatment. The reason for this is plain: the state simply has no interest
in compulsory physical treatment of persons who do not pose a direct
threat of contamination of others with their disease. The mental process
which a physically ill individual undergoes in choosing whether or not to
seek treatment is accorded great respect.
Society has determined that
it is more desirable to allow a physically sick individual the choice rather
than to compel -him to undergo treatment.5 6 The Lessard court extended
this analysis to those with a sickness of the mind. That is, even though
an individual is alleged to be mentally ill and even though it is thought
that treatment might be beneficial to his well being, the power of the
state to compel his confinement and treatment will be cut off "unless the
state can prove that the person is unable to make a decision about hospitalization because of the nature of his illness."' 57 It is clear that even
though treatment may in itself be beneficial to the individual, the disadvantages involved in institutional confinement (e.g., stigma, difficulties in
obtaining release and in finding a job, etc.) may result in the conclusion
that the "sane" choice would be not to seek such treatment.
One drawback to this approach may be found in the use of the phrase
"unable to make a decision." Does the state's evidence that an individual
stands mute at a commitment proceeding prove inability to make a decision? Does the conscious decision not to seek treatment in the face of
several doctors' reports that indicate that treatment is recommended evidence inability to make a decision because the decision is wholly unwise
in view of professional reports? Such results were apparently unintended
by the opinion in Lessard, but it seems possible that a finding of inability
54. Id.
55. See, e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 27 (1905): "Upon the
principle of self-defense, of paramount necessity, a community has the right to pro-

tect itself against an epidemic of disease which threatens the safety of its members."
56. See Comment, supra note 35, at 1290.
57.

349 F. Supp. at 1094.
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could be made upon a showing of (1) a failure to manifest ability, or
(2) a decision which, when viewed in the context of professional opinion,
exhibits unwise or irrational judgment.
A final reason for the requirement of a finding of dangerousness is the
present state of medical knowledge on mental illness which, due to "unavoidably ambiguous generalities" allows the diagnostician the ability "to
shoehorn into the mentally diseased class almost any person he wishes,
for whatever reason, to put there."' 8 So long as the state's power is being
employed, the decision to commit must remain essentially a social and
not a medical one. To effectuate this end, the criteria for commitment
must reflect (1) a standard which judges can apply without a virtually
complete reliance upon medical opinion, and (2) a sitandard which will
constitutionally justify the invocation of state power. A strict standard
of dangerousness meets -these tests.
Lessard limits the state in the use of parens patriae as a source of commitment power because of its stated requirement that either dangerousness to self or others, or inability to make a decision concerning treatment
be shown before treatment is justified. The non-dangerous mentally ill
individual who retains the capacity to make a decision concerning treatment is thus placed beyond the state's commitment powers. Where, however, dangerousness to self or others is shown (by the stated standard applicable in each case), a showing of decisional capacity will not, under
the Lessard standard, defeat commitment. In addition, the strictness with
which the court defines dangerousness in itself narrows the class of potential committees.
The court next proceeded to determine the standard of proof which
is constitutionally required in a civil commitment case. While the Wisconsin statutes are silent as to the burden of proof which is permissible,59
the Wisconsin Supreme Court in In re Hogan60 has approved a jury instruction allowing commitment based on a preponderance of the evidence.
The court found this to be an impermissible standard in light of Woodby
v. Immigration and Naturalization Service.61 In Woodby, the United
States Supreme Court disallowed a deportation based "upon no higher
degree of proof than applies in a negligence case."6' 2 Since commitment
involves greater deprivations of liberty than those involved in deportation,
the court reasoned, it follows that commitment based upon a standard
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id., citing Livermore, supra note 33, at 80.
Id.
232 Wis. 521, 287 N.W. 725 (1939).
385 U.S. 276 (1966).
Id. at 285.
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impermissible in a deportation case is likewise impermissible in a commitment case.63
The Court in Woodby announced a standard of "clear, unequivocal,
and convincing evidence. '64 The court in Lessard held that proof beyond
a reasonable doubt of all facts necessary to show mental illness and dan65
gerousness is the requisite standard of proof in a commitment hearing. 1
The court based this holding primarily upon In re Winship,6" in which
the United States Supreme Court held that proof beyond a reasonable
doubt was required to prove every fact necessary in a juvenile delinquency proceeding. Since the same interest in liberty is involved in both
commitment and juvenile delinquency proceedings, the court reasoned,
the same "extreme caution in factfinding"6 7 should be required of the
factfinder in reaching his result. Furthermore, there is the added factor
of a loss of civil rights upon a commitment which is not present in a delinquency proceeding making the Lessard standard more compelling. 6
It is submitted, however, that the stated standard is unfontunately strict.
Will it be possible for a trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt
that "there is an extreme likelihood that if the person is not confined he
will do immediate 'harm to himself or others?" 69 The Lessard court noted
its awareness of the problems attendant upon predictions of future conduct, stating that commitments 'based upon such prediction must be
"viewed with suspicion . ...
"70
It stated a belief that commitment can
be justified in those cases in which "the proper 'burden of proof is satisfied
and dangerousness is based upon a finding of a recent overt act, attempt
or threat to do substantial harm to oneself or another."'1 The court's concern with the protection of the due process rights of alleged mentally ill
individuals will not be realized, however, if all that is required to find
commitment appropriate is a showing of some prior conduct. The better
72
approach it is submitted, is that suggested in Tippelt v. Maryland in63.
64.

349 F. Supp. at 1094.
385 U.S. at 286.

65.

349 F. Supp. at 1095.

66. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
67. Id. at 365.
68. 349 F. Supp. at 1095. See also note 81 infra and accompanying text.

In

In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648 (D.C. Cir. 1973), a commitment based upon a "preponderance of the evidence" standard rather than a "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard was held to constitute a deprivation of due process.

69.

349 F. Supp. at 1093.

70.

Id.

71.
72.

Id.
436 F.2d 1153, 1159 (4th Cir. 1971) (Sobeloff, J., concurring in part and
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volving a defective delinquency proceeding, in which "clear, unequivocal
and convincing evidence" was suggested as the appropriate standard as
to the issue of dangerousness, and proof beyond a reasonable doubt was
73
suggested as the appropriate standard as to all objective facts in dispute.
By using different standards for distinct issues, dangerousness retains its
usefulness as a matter of prediction and allows the defendant a sound
basis upon which to contest such a finding. The Lessard standard would
apparently authorize commitment upon a showing of some prior dangerous conduct which would evidence present tendencies upon which a prediction as to future conduct could be based. It is true that dangerousness
is difficult if not impossible to accurately predict,74 but requiring that it
be shown beyond a reasonable doubt may encourage some factfinders
to place unwarranted reliance upon prior conduct alone, -thereby severely
limiting its usefulness.
The third aspect of the court's substantive analysis involved the concept
of less drastic means. The principle was stated in Shelton v. Tucker 75
that
even though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that
purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved. The breadth
of legislative abridgement must be viewed in light of less drastic means
76
for achieving the same basic purpose.

In Lake v. Cameron,77 involving 'a habeas corpus proceeding, a burden
of exploration of possible alternatives to commitment was imposed upon
the state. The burden was imposed on the 'basis of a provision in the
District of Columbia Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill Act 78 which aldissenting in part), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted sub nora. Murel v. Baltimore City Criminal Court, 407 U.S. 355 (1972).
73. In the words of Judge Sobeloff,
[Als to the ultimate issue of the inmate's dangerousness, the 'beyond a reasonable doubt standard may in practical operation be too onerous. After
all, the ultimate issue is not as in a criminal case whether an alleged act
was committed or event occurred, but the much more subjective issue of
the individual's mental and emotional character. Such a subjective judgment cannot ordinarily attain the same "state of certitude" demanded in
criminal cases. A number of commentators have suggested that a standard
lying between the civil and the criminal may suffice where a determination
of "dangerousness" is at issue. Frequently advocated is a standard of
"clear and convincing evidence." (citations omitted)
Id. at 1165.
74. See Livermore, supra note 33, at 84 for an excellent discussion of the point.
75. 364U.S. 479 (1960).
76. Id. at 488.
77. 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966) [hereinafter cited as Lake].
78. D.C. CODE §§ 21-501 to 21-591 (Supp. V 1966).
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lowed the court, after a finding that the individual was subject to commitment, to order "any other alternative course of treatment which the court
believes will be in the best interests of the person or of the public. '79
In Lessard, a burden of proof of alternatives to commitment was imposed upon the state (whereas Lake imposed a burden of exploration)
and this burden was imposed without the benefit of a statute as in Lake.
Specifically,
the person recommending full-time involuntary hospitalization must bear
the burden of proving (1) what alternatives are available; (2) what alternatives were investigated; and (3) why the investigated alternatives were
not deemed suitable. 80

Thus, even though the standards for commitment are satisfied, full-time
involuntary hospitalization may not be ordered unless all less drastic
means of achieving 'the same objective have been investigated and found
not suitable in the individual case.
B.

ProceduralSafeguards Required in the Commitment Process.

The basic principle upon which the court based its holdings with reference to procedural rights was that it is the seriousness of the deprivation
of liberty and the consequences which follow a finding of committable
mental illness which require strict adherence -to the stringent procedural
requirements which apply to other proceedings in which individual liberty
is in jeopardy. The court noted several reasons for dispelling the notion
that parens patriae should justify less stringent procedural rights in a civil
commitment proceeding than are required in a criminal trial. Among the
reasons cited were loss of numerous civil rights, stigma which accompanies
release, and statistics which indicate that a person committed to a mental
institution has a much greater chance of dying than if left at large. 8' The
court noted that
the interests in avoiding civil commitment are at least as high as those
of persons accused of criminal offenses. The resulting burden on the state
79. D.C. CODE § 21-545(b) (Supp. V 1966). It may also be noted that in State
v. Sanchez, 80 N.M. 438, 457 P.2d 370 (1969), the Supreme Court of New Mexico, citing with approval the dissent in Lake, rejected the contention of an involuntarily committed individual that hospitalization imposed a restraint much broader
than was necessary to protect him from injury to himself. Absent a statutory duty
to explore alternatives, the court held, no duty existed. Id. at 373.
80. 349 F. Supp. at 1096.
81. Id. at 1088-90, For tables listing the legal effect of an adjudication of mental illness in the several states, see BRAKEL AND RocK, supra note 7, at 240 (marriage), 244 (divorce), 248 (adoption), 273 (legal competency), 315 (personal and
property rights), 322 (testamentary capacity), 326 (engagement in occupations),
and 333 (voting, holding office, jury service and driver's license).
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to justify civil commitment must be correspondingly high. 8 2

The issue of procedural due process requirements was raised by plaintiffs in that part of the complaint which alleged that the Wisconsin procedure for civil commitment denied due process by (1) permitting involuntary detention for a possible 145 days without a hearing on the necessity of the detention; (2) failing to make notice of hearings mandatory;
(3) failing to give adequate and timely notice where notice is given; (4)
failing to provide a mandatory notice of right to trial by jury; (5) failing
to give right to or appointment of counsel at a meaningful time; (6) failing to permit counsel to be present at psychiatric interviews; (7) failing
to provide for the exclusion of hearsay evidence and for the privilege
against self-incrimination; and (8) failing to provide access to an independent psychiatric examination by a physician of the allegedly mentally
ill person's choice. s3 With the exception of the sixth 4 and eighth allegation above,8 5 the court in Lessard agreed that these various failures of
the Wisconsin civil commitment statute did deny plaintiffs due process
and the court declared each a prerequisite to a valid commitment as a
matter of due process of law.
The requirement that an individual subject to oivil commitment be
given prior notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to a valid commitment was established in Lessard with principal reliance upon Boddie v.
Connecticut"" and Gault. As a result of its analysis, five sections of she
Wisconsin civil commitment statute8 7 were held unconstitutional on their
face ,and as applied to Miss Lessard.
Boddie established the proposition that an individual must "be given
an opportunity for a hearing before 'he is deprived of any significant property interest . ... 88 Since an individual's interest in liberty is more

compelling than his interest in property rights, the court reasoned that
"no significant deprivation of liberty can be justified without a prior hearing on the necessity of the detention." 89 Within this analysis, however,
82. 349 F. Supp. at 1090.
83. Id. at 1082.
84. See text accompanying note 97 infra for the court's suggested alternatives.
85. Since an offer of independent psychiatric examination was refused by plaintiff's counsel, the court did not rule on the issue. 349 F. Supp. at 1082 n.2.
86. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
87. Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 51.02(1); 51.03; and 51.04(1) to 51.04(3) (Supp.
1969).
88. 401 U.S. at 379 (emphasis added).
89. 349 F. Supp. at 1091. See also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970),
in which the Supreme Court held that due process requires an evidentiary hearing
prior to the termination of welfare benefits.
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the court did allow for the emergency detention of violent individuals
without a prior hearing, but only until such time as a probable cause hearing on the necessity of the detention can .be held. The court noted that
the maximum period during which an individual can be held pursuant
to emergency procedures without a probable cause hearing is 48 hours
and that due process is violated where there is no meaningful opportunity
to be heard at the preliminary hearing due either to medication or lack
of counsel. 90
The full hearing on the necessity for detention is required
as soon after detention as possible within the limits made necessary in order for psychiatrists to make their examination and reports and for the patient to be able to prepare any defense. 9 1

While the court stated its "belief" that "from ten to fourteen days should
be the maximum period [during] which an individual can be detained
without a full hearing, '92 it appears -to have allowed ,a possible escape
from this requirement. The court stated that if full examination is not
accomplished during this period due to inadequate personnel, "it is difficult to see how continued detention can be said 'to be beneficial to the
patient. '9 3 It appears that this is unfortunate dictum. If benefit to the
patient is the key to the required period for a hearing, this invites return
to the parens patriae model, since hospital authorities could argue that
even though there has been inadequate personnel to conduct the required
examinations, there are sufficient personnel to provide treatment to the
individual. This argument may be seen as a viable one in view of the
variety of psychiatric theories as to proper methods of treatment and in
view of the 'belief expressed by several judges that the adequacy of treatment issue is not within the court's competence to adjudicate.9 4 A delay
in a full hearing under such an argument should be unjustified in light
of Boddie and in light of this court's attack upon the parens patriae
model. It remains to be seen whether such an argument "will be successful to delay a full hearing on the necessity of detention.
In order for the notice of the hearing to comply with the requirements
of due process, it
"must be given sufficiently in advance of scheduled court proceedings so
that reasonable opportunity to prepare will be afforded," and it must set
forth the basis for detention with particularity. 95
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

349 F. Supp. at 1091-92.
Id. at 1092.
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., Dobson v. Cameron, 383 F.2d 519 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
349 F. Supp. at 1092, quoting In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 33 (1967).
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The court held that an individual subject to commitment is entitled to
assistance of counsel as soon after the proceedings have begun as is reasonably feasible, and this includes the right to appointed counsel where
the individual is indigent. Counsel must be present at the preliminary
hearing on detention, must have sufficient time to prepare initial defenses,
and must have access -to all reports which will be introduced at the com96
mitment hearing.
In balancing the right to effective aid of counsel with the state's interests in meaningful consultation, the court decided that counsel shall not
be required in the psychiatric interview. Rather, the state is allowed to
show that means other than attendance of counsel at the interview, such
as recording and making available to counsel the written results of the
interview, "will prove as effective in maintaining the individual's rights
97
with less disruption of the traditional psychiatrist-patient relationship."
Competing considerations also attended the decision as to whether a
privilege of self-incrimination should apply to the commitment process.
On one hand, the statements of an alleged mentally ill person may subject
him to involuntary loss of freedom. On the other hand, any realistic possibilities for treatment of an individual who is subject to commitment
may be lost if counsel is allowed to instruct his client not to answer questions put to him by an examining psychiatrist. The court reconciled
these competing interests in favor of the privilege with reliance upon the
Supreme Court's rationale in Gault:
It is true that the statement of the privilege in. the Fifth Amendment
is that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." However, it is also clear that the availability of
the privilege does not turn upon the type of proceeding in which its protection is invoked, but upon the nature of the statement or admission and
the exposure which it invites . . . . [Ojur Constitution guarantees that no
person shall be 'compelled' to be a witness against himself when he is
threatened wth a deprivation of liberty-a command which this Court has
broadly applied and generously implemented .... 98

The implementation of the privilege requires that the subject be informed by counsel that he need not speak to the examining psychiatrist
and that statements made may be used to effectuate commitment. Commitment may be valid, however, where the individual did not have
"knowledge" that he was under no obligation to speak if his failure to
have knowledge was due to mental illness.9 9 A subsequent finding of
96.
97.
98.
99.

349 F. Supp. at 1097-1100.
Id. at 1100.
Id. at 1100-01, quoting In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 49-50 (1967).
349 F. Supp. at 1101. The court noted that if an individual's rights are ex-
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mental illness based upon such statements will not be held to offend due
process. The court provided a rule, however, which forbids commitment
based upon statements made to a psychiatrist by an alleged mentally ill
individual unless voluntarily given after notice of possible consequences1 00
Finally, the court provided for the exclusion of hearsay evidence in
commitment proceedings to the same extent that it is excluded in trials
generally. The court reasoned that "[t]he weaknesses of hearsay evidence are the same, whatever the nature of the proceeding.'' i In the
same way that the civil-criminal distinction was found an unsatisfactory
basis on which to base relaxed due process standards for civil commitment, it was considered unsatisfactory in the specific context of hearsay
evidence. The court reiterated its basic position that the seriousness of
the deprivation of liberty and ,the consequences which follow an adjudication of mental illness require no relaxation in the protections afforded in
02
other proceedings in which individual liberty is at stake.1
V.

CONCLUSION

Lessard v. Schmidt is a case of great significance to those concerned
with the protection of the rights of persons subject to civil commitment.
It characterized plaintiffs' claims as an attack upon the parens patriae
model and the abuses upon individual liberty which have resulted from
it. Su bstantively, it defines and limits the state in the exercise of parens
patriae power over mentally ill persons; it requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of all facts required to be shown for commitment; and it
requires implementation of the concept of less drastic means in the commitment process. Procedurally, it requires notice and an opportunity to
be heard prior to commitment; affords a right to counsel; allows a privilege against self-incrimination; and provides for the exclusion of hearsay
evidence in commitment proceedings.
As may be seen from the discussion herein, there has been a definite
trend of case law directed towards the expansion of protections afforded
society's forgotten members. As may also be seen, this trend is not
generally prevalent and the protections afforded vary widely from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
plained to him in simple terms, he may be presumed to have "knowledge" since

there is
n.33.
100.
101.
102.

a presumption of competency in a commitment proceeding.
Id. at 1102.
Id.at 1103.
Id.at 1102-03.

Id. at 1101
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The time is ripe for Supreme Court action in the mental health field.
The defendants in Lessard have filed a notice of appeal to the Supreme
Court. 0 3 It is hoped that the Court will respond to the need for a clear
and uniform statement of rights to which persons subject to commitment
nationally are entitled.
Arnold H. Landis

103. Notice of appeal filed, 42 U.S.L.W. 3201 (U.S. Sept. 28, 1973) (No. 568).
On January 14, 1974, the Supreme Court, Mr. Justice Douglas dissenting, entered
a per curiam order which, after noting that the judgment entered by the Lessard
court was sufficient to invoke the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction, vacated the
judgment for lack of specificity with respect to the injunctive relief granted and remanded the case to the District Court for clarification of its order. Schmidt v.
Lessard, 94 S. Ct. 713 (1974).

